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An Empirical Analysis of Board Activity, Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms, and Firm Value 
 
Lisiolo Lishenga, PhD1 
 
We studied the relationship between board activity, a firm’s existing corporate governance 
structures and mechanisms, and firm value. The association between board activity and 
corporate governance variables is complex and multi-faceted. The two testable propositions in 
the study were that: an association exists between board activity and an array of corporate 
governance mechanisms; and that board activity adds value to the firm and by inference to 
shareholders. Board activity, measured by the frequency of board meetings, had a negative but 
lagged relationship with financial performance, a negative relationship with the size of the 
board, a negative relationship with insider ownership, a positive relationship with both the 
number of block holders and the number of other directorships held by directors, and 
insignificant relationships to both board independence and the number of committees.  This 
confirms that other ownership and board composition characteristics could substitute board 
activity. The analysis of the interaction between board meetings frequency and the value of the 
firm is lagged but positive, implying relatively low market valuations triggers intervention of 
the board through frequent meetings that apparently impacts positively on firm value. 
 
Key Words: Board, Board activity, corporate governance, Governance mechanisms, Firm value.  
 
                                                 
1
 Lecturer, Department of Finance and Accounting, University of Nairobi jlishenga@uonbi.ac.ke 
1st DBA-Africa Management Review International Conference (2015) 
20th March , 2015 Pp. 1-20 
2 |          1 s t  D B A  A f r i c a  M a n a g e m e n t  r e v i e w  c o n f e r e n c e  2 0 1 5  
Introduction  
Since the advent of the corporation and the 
corporation’s increasing dominance as the 
business organization of choice, attention 
has focused on the inefficiencies inherent 
in the separation of control from 
ownership that comes with the corporate 
structure.  The proper constitution and 
functioning of a board of directors has 
been the monitoring device commonly 
used to ensure that the control and 
management of the firm is carried on for 
the benefit of the firm’s owners (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997.Shareholders with their 
diversified interests do not necessarily 
have the professional capacity to run the 
organization.  They appoint directors 
entrusting them to run the organization 
fairly, transparently and efficiently to 
enhance shareholders’ value through well 
defined objectives and strategies. The 
directors in turn delegate the day-to-day 
operations and the judicious 
implementation of strategies and policies 
of the organization to management who 
establish a system structures for the 
efficient operation of the organization.  
The directors and management are 
therefore agents of the shareholders 
(Hendry & Kiel, 2004.   
 
Corporate governance, defined as the 
manner in which companies are controlled 
and evaluated continues to attract interest 
in emerging and developing economies as 
the link between good corporate 
governance and national economic 
development becomes clearer.  
Furthermore, investors have become more 
discerning and insist on high standards of 
corporate governance in companies in 
which they invest, with activist 
shareholders becoming more vociferous at 
annual general meeting in calling 
management to account and demanding 
that they receive value for their 
investment.  The monitoring role of the 
board of directors has long been 
recognized as a crucial component of 
corporate governance.  In practice 
however, the board of directors is often 
criticized as a toothless bulldog 
characterized by dysfunctional behavior 
and largely ineffective in overseeing the 
CEO, who in many cases may have 
influenced the choice of the directors to 
the board. Davies (2000) argues that even 
non-executive directors (NEDs) are supine 
functionaries, with vested interests   
sharing the same ‘high compensation’ 
culture as the executive directors and thus 
perform poorly as monitors of executives’ 
remuneration packages.  He concludes 
“they advance their own interests at the 
expense of the shareholders” (P. 8). 
 
Corporate governance guidelines such as 
those proposed by the Cadbury Committee 
report (1992) and the CMA (2002) 
recommend a number of principles that are 
essential for good corporate governance 
practices. The guidelines go further and 
define the role and responsibilities of the 
board of directors. In order to fulfill its 
responsibility of vigilant monitoring of 
management, the board of directors would 
have to devote a considerate amount of 
time to the company’s affairs. Yet neither 
economic theory nor corporate laws in 
Kenya address the issue of the frequency 
of board meetings, their length, quality and 
content. 
 
An understanding of the frequency of 
board meetings and its determinants 
should presumably shed light on the 
effectiveness with which the board carries 
out its oversight functions. On the face of 
1st DBA-Africa Management Review International Conference (2015) 
20th March , 2015 Pp. 1-20 
3 |          1 s t  D B A  A f r i c a  M a n a g e m e n t  r e v i e w  c o n f e r e n c e  2 0 1 5  
it, the number of meetings held by the 
board could be evidence of how effective 
the board has been in monitoring 
management.  But for a board to be 
effective it need not necessarily meet 
frequently. Board effectiveness could be a 
function of number of other factors i.e. 
existence of standing committees of the 
board, independence of directors, director 
(insider) ownership, presence of block 
holders   and the financial position and 
performance of the company (Mululu, 
2005). How these factors influence the 
frequency of board meetings is not at all 
clear. For example, a lot of board’s 
mandate could be exercised through 
committees, thereby obviating the need for 
frequent meetings. On the other hand, 
independent directors may put pressure on 
the CEO to schedule frequent meetings 
especially when a crisis is looming. 
Determining the direction of the 
relationship between these factors and 
meeting frequency is thus a question that 
requires empirical testing. 
 
This study’s twin aims were; first, to 
identify how corporate governance 
mechanisms influence board activity as 
measured by board meeting frequency (the 
determinants of board meeting frequency), 
for companies listed on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange (NSE). Secondly, the study 
sought to determine whether board activity 
as measured by board meeting frequency 
had any significant effect on the value 
(financial performance) of companies.   
The study established that board meetings 
were held quite frequently. Over 75% of 
the companies had nine (9) meetings in a 
year during the period of 1998 – 2003. 
Overall the findings were consistent with 
the agency theory of contracting, which 
posit relationships between a board’s 
oversight effectiveness (here proxied by 
meeting frequency), and board size, insider 
ownership, independence of the board, 
number of block holders and the existence 
of committees. Further, the study found 
that board activity is positively related to 
the financial performance and market 
value of firms. The findings suggest that 
board meetings are an important 
dimension in board operations and 
particularly in the board’s ability to 
effectively monitor management and 




In recent times, the frontiers of corporate 
governance have been expanding rapidly, 
in tandem with the increasing gravity of 
governance challenges to directors, boards, 
investors, management, regulators and 
academicians. Yet issues of governance 
are not new. Corporate governance has 
been practiced for as long as there have 
been corporate entities, characterized by 
the separation of ownership from 
management and control. Indeed, Adam 
Smith shows that he understood the issue 
of corporate governance, even though he 
did not use the phrase: “Directors of 
companies, being managers of other 
people’s money, it cannot well be expected 
that they will watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which partners in a 
corporate company watch over their own” 
(Smith 1776 edn 1976; p264). 
 
It was not however until the 1980’s that 
the topic received much attention.“The 
proper governance of companies will 
become crucial to the world economy as 
the proper governing of countries” 
(Bowes, 2000: p.1). A decade earlier Peter 
Drucker, when examining the challenges 
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managers would face in the 1990’s 
predicted that:  “The governance of 
business is likely to become an issue 
throughout the developed world” (The 
Economist, 21st October 1989: p26). 
These predictions have come to pass as 
evidenced by the interest that the subject 
of corporate governance has generated in 
the media, professional, academic 
literature and society at large. 
  
The need for enterprises to practice  "good 
corporate governance" has become 
universal, becoming important with each 
passing day. In his Forward to a NASDAQ 
review Melalksne  (2010) points out that, 
although the "Comply or explain" 
principle is still not a mandatory 
obligation, nevertheless it requires 
corporation to practice sound corporate 
governance or explain any failure to 
comply with the tenets of sound 
governance.  
 
 Several reasons can be advanced for the 
burgeoning concern with corporate 
governance. Firstly, the interdependence 
between the society and business demand 
that companies be accountable to the 
society as company decisions have far 
reaching effects on the society welfare and 
the environment.  Companies not only 
provide essential goods and services, they 
pay taxes, create employment and engage 
in community-based activities and have 
thus become development partners with 
the society.  As society becomes 
increasingly dependent on companies it 
(society) becomes more concerned with 
corporate activities and their governance 
as they (companies) play a key role in the 
creation of wealth both at the national and 
the corporate level. Drucker (1974) says 
that society will scrutinize company 
activities and especially those of large and 
visible business so as to ensure 
accountability.  
 
Secondly, public attention was provoked 
following high profile corporate scandals 
and collapses in recent times that, without 
any warning, wiped out the wealth of 
shareholders in one fell swoop (examples 
include Enron, Parmalatt, WorldCom, the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), among others). 
These failures resulted in intense pressure 
to reexamine the governance of 
corporations. Kenya has had its fare share 
of financial scams as demonstrated by the 
collapse of Lonrho, Trust Bank, Euro 
Bank, Kenya Finance Trust and Uchumi 
Supermarkets Limited. On the whole, 
many pundits and scholars ascribe 
corporate failure to a weak board, unable 
to exercise their mandate adequately 
(Stiles, 1993).  
 
Thirdly, the hard economic times and 
shocks all over the world have exposed 
corporate weaknesses.  The volatility of 
the world economy has significantly 
increased the risks faced by companies 
today.  Stiles (1993) asserts that in such a 
non-compromising environment we can no 
longer afford to overlook corporate fraud, 
mismanagement and unjustified executive 
pay awards among other irregularities (See 
also Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Dimsdale 
& Prevezer, 1994). 
 
Finally, the globalization of economies 
and the growth of financial and investment 
markets in the 1990s has presented an 
opportunity for institutional investors to 
deploy their massive funds internationally.  
As they seek to do so, they are insisting on 
high standards of corporate governance in 
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the companies in which they must invest.  
(CACG; 1999).  Investor confidence can 
only be enhanced with good corporate 
practices underpinned by accountability 
and transparency.   
Given the foregoing factors, governments 
and boards of corporations have been 
forced to pay attention to fundamental 
issues of corporate governance as they 
pursue national and corporate economic 
wellbeing. Without investment, companies 
will stagnate and collapse.  If business 
enterprises do not prosper, there will be no 
economic growth; no employment, no 
taxes paid and invariably the national 
economy will stagnate.  The country needs 
well-governed and managed business 
enterprises that can attract investments, 
create jobs and wealth, and remain viable, 
sustainable and competitive in the global 
market place.“Good corporate governance 
therefore becomes a prerequisite for 
national economic development” (CACG, 
1999, p.6). 
 
In Kenya, the institutions that have been at 
the forefront in sensitizing the corporate 
sector in Kenya on corporate governance 
are The Capital Markets Authority (CMA), 
the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE), The 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(Kenya, The Center for Corporate 
Governance (CCG) and Central Bank of 
Kenya (CBK).  
 
The CMA created a major impact in the 
pursuit of the goal for good corporate 
governance in Kenya when it issued in 
2002 the Capital Market guidelines on 
Corporate Governance Practice by listed 
companies.  These guidelines were 
published under a gazette notice No. 369 
of 25th January 2002 and not a legal notice 
and therefore do not have the force of law.  
However, certain of the guidelines have 
subsequently been incorporated into legal 
notice No.60 of 3rd May 2002 as part of 
the Capital Markets guidelines and are 
enforceable in law.  The stated objective of 
the CMA guidelines on Corporate 
Governance is to strengthen and promote 
the standards of self-regulation and bring 
the level of governance practices in line 
with international trends. 
 
The NSE has amended its Listing Manual 
and incorporated the CMA guidelines on 
corporate governance into the continuous 
obligations of listed companies and it 
continuously monitors compliance by 
listed companies with these obligations. In 
Kenya the emphasis on good corporate 
governance and accountability to 
shareholders and stakeholders has been on 
public listed companies.  The potential for 
listed companies being subjected to 
sanctions for non-compliance by either the 
CMA or NSE has played an important role 
encouraging compliance with the 
guidelines (Mululu, 2005).  
 
The Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (Kenya) requires its members 
to report on the corporate governance 
practices of companies they audit and the 
Institute of Certified Public Secretaries 
(Kenya) also encourage its members to 
ensure compliance with the corporate 
governance guidelines. Both institutions 
train their members on corporate 
governance issues.  
 
Methods 
This study’s objectives were two-pronged: 
First, it sought to examine the association 
between board activity as measured by the 
frequency of board meetings and corporate 
governance mechanisms.  Secondly, it 
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sought to determine the interactions 
between board meeting frequency and firm 
value.  The data used for the study was 
from the companies listed on the NSE 
covering the six years between1998 to 
2003. In terms of corporate governance 
mechanisms the study focused on the 
composition on the board of directors, the 
board size, the leadership structure, the 
number of board committees and how 
often they meet, the shareholders and the 
extent of their shareholding.  This 
information was sourced from the financial 
statements of the companies, the NSE and 
CMA.   
 
Information on the number of board 
meetings, the number of board committee 
meetings and the number of other 
directorships held by outside directors 
which was not readily available in the 
financial reports was obtained from the 
company secretaries  
 
To determine the interaction between 
board meetings frequency and financial 
performance, the study reviewed the 
financial performances of the quoted 
companies from the period 1998 to 2003.  
Statistical analyses were conducted using 
the corporate governance mechanisms as 
independent variables and price book ratio 
as the dependent variable (as a proxy for 
firm value).  It was expected that the 
frequency of board meetings would 
increase as the firm value declined and that 
following intense board activity the firm 
value would increase due to the active 
interest of the board of directors in line 





A list of all companies quoted on the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange as at 31st 
December 2003 was obtained from the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange as per Appendix 
1.  This list had 48 companies whose 
equity was quoted and actively traded on 
the NSE in both the main investment 
market segment and the alternative 
investment market segment.  All the 48 




Data on the composition of the board, the 
board size, the leadership structure, the 
total number of shares, the shareholders 
and the extent of shareholding was 
obtained from the annual financial reports 
of the companies.  This information was 
also verified by the information collected 
from the company secretaries.  
 
Data on the numbers of the board 
meetings, the number of standing board 
committees and how often they met, and 
the number of other directorships held by 
the outside directors and whether director 
incentive plans and employee stock 
options were in use was obtained from the 
company secretaries. Data on the 
company’s financial performance was 
obtained from the company’s financial 
statements for the years 1998 to 2003.  The 




The data obtained on the corporate 
governance characteristics was analyzed 
using descriptive statistics. The first 
objective was to explore the impact of 
corporate governance variables on board 
activity.  The proxy for board activity is in 
frequency of board meetings.  Governance 
1st DBA-Africa Management Review International Conference (2015) 
20th March , 2015 Pp. 1-20 
7 |          1 s t  D B A  A f r i c a  M a n a g e m e n t  r e v i e w  c o n f e r e n c e  2 0 1 5  
mechanisms may be related in complicated 
ways and, as earlier stated, this study relies 
on the notion that governance mechanisms 
are substitutes or complements (Vafeas 
(1999)).  Hence Pearson’s correlation 
analysis was used to measure the degree of 
linear relationship between the variables of 
the study.  
 
To investigate the interactions between 
board meeting frequency and corporate 
governance mechanisms (the determinants 
of board meetings frequency) panel data 
and regression analysis were used.  T- 
statistics and analysis of variances were 
done to validate the model.  The model 
tested was similar to one of Vafeas (1999) 
but with the necessary adjustments and 
configuration to domesticate it to the 
Kenyan conditions and environment. 
 
The importance of board meeting 
frequency is considered an open question.  
Vafeas (1999) assertion is that, “It would 
seem easier and less costly for a firm to 
adjust the frequency of its board meetings 
to attain better governance than to change 
the composition of its board or its 
ownership structure or approve charter 
amendments”.  
 
The variables used in this study are defined 






Table 1: Operationalisation and Measurement of Variables 
Variable Specification Definition /measurement 
Board meeting 
frequency 
NBM  The total number of annual board meetings for each firm 
Board size  NBD The total number of directors sitting on each company’s  
 Board. 
Executive directors  NED The total number of executive directors of each company’s  
Board 




NSCB The total number of standing board committees  
 
 
Number of standing 
Committee Meetings 
NSCM The total number of meetings of 








NAO - The number of directors representing the   
    unaffiliated block holder 
shareholders 
Shareholding    NTLS  The number of outside directors with potential  
business ties with the firm e.g. lawyers 




(NPUB) The number of percentage of total shares held by the  
unaffiliated block holders (those who own more than 5%of the 
firm’s stock) 
Inside directorships  NSOD The number of percentage of shares held by officers and  
Directors 
Other Directorships  NBOD The total number of other directorships held by outside   
directors. 
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Table 2 shows that the mean number of 
board of meetings, over the period of the 
study, was 7 (seven).  The statistics show 
that over half of the observations had six 
annual meetings (medians=6) over the 
period of the study.  The minimum number 
of meeting in a year over the same period 
is two while the maximum is eighteen 
(18).  Over seventy five percent the 
companies in this study had nine (9) 
meetings in a year.  
 
In a particular year, the average number of 
board of directors is nine.  Unaffiliated 
block holder directorship (NUBD) and 
affiliated outsiders (NAO) are low with a 
mean of one.  Insider ownership (NSOD) 
is rampant with a mean or average of 40 
percent and a maximum of 10 percent in 
some firms.  
 
Unaffiliated block holders (NPUB) hold 
substantial number of shares.  Due to low 
response or lack of it, the variable, 
directors’ incentive plans (DIP) is dropped 
further analyses.  Most of the respondents 
were reluctant to disclose information on 
director’s allowances and bonuses and 
details on the subject of insider 
shareholder ownership (NSOD) i.e. there 
were 156 missing answers out of 270 
expected.  At the same time most of the 
firms were less informed about other 
directorships held by outside directors.  As 
all quoted companies have a separate 
leadership structure (See Jebet, 2001) the 
variable BD is also dropped. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Variables 
Variable  Mean Median St.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Number of board meetings (NBM) 7 6 4 2 18 
Number of board committees (NSBC) 4 4 2 1 8 
Number of committee meetings (NSCM) 15 12 13 3 72 
Number of board directors (NBD) 9 8 2 1 14 
Number of executive directors (NED) 1 1 1 1 5 
Number of non-executive directors (NND) 7 7 2 0 13 
Number of unaffiliated board directors 
(NUBD) 
1 1 1 0 5 
Number of affiliated outside directors 
(NAO) 
1 1 1 0 4 
Number percentage of shares held by largest 
shareholder (NTLS ) 
36 35 15 2 75 
Number percentage of unaffiliated block 
holders (NPUB)  
47 48 19 0 74 
Number percentage of shares held by 
insiders (NSOD) 
40 48 23 0 70 
Number of other directorship held by outside 
directors (NBOD) 
4 1 12 0 63 
Leadership Structure (BD) 1 1 0 1 1 




Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics of 
corporate governance characteristics, 
analyzed for each sector of the Nairobi 
Stock Exchange. Over the period of the 
1st DBA-Africa Management Review International Conference (2015) 
20th March , 2015 Pp. 1-20 
9 |          1 s t  D B A  A f r i c a  M a n a g e m e n t  r e v i e w  c o n f e r e n c e  2 0 1 5  
study firms in the financial sectors had the 
highest number of board meetings, 10 on 
the average.  This was followed by 
industrials that had seven (7) board 
meetings on average.  
 
The years 2002 and 2003 experienced the 
highest board meetings over the period.  
These were difficult periods for many 
companies with most of them reporting a 
decline in earnings or even losses.  Over 
the same period a number of companies 
opted for extensive restructuring.  
 
An examination of the minimum and 
maximum meetings, over the period of the 
study 1998 to 2003, a trend emerges that 
demonstrate that the number of board 
meeting tend to increase during  periods 
following a decline in earnings, providing 
prima facie evidence that board’s meet 
more often during crisis situations.  Insider 
ownership, i.e. managers who are 
shareholders, is substantial in firms that 
are categorized as financial or industrial.  
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of corporate governance characteristics, analyzed for each sector 
of the Nairobi Stock Exchange 
Corporate governance variables are defined and measured as follows: 
Number of board meetings (NBM), Number of board meetings (NBM), Number of board committees (NSBC), 
Number of committee meetings (NSCM), Number of board directors (NBD), Number of executive directors 
(NED), Number of non-executive directors (NND), Number of unaffiliated board directors (NUBD), Number of 
affiliated outside directors (NAO), Number proportion of shares held by largest shareholder (NTLS ), Number 
percentage of unaffiliated block holders (NPUB), Number percentage of shares held by insiders (NSOD), 
Number of other directorship held by outside directors (NBOD), Leadership Structure (BD), Director Incentive 
Plans (DIP ). Industry: 1 = Agriculture; 2 = Commerce; 3 = Financials; and 4 = Industrial & allied. 
Variable Industry Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
NBM 1 5 5 1 2 8 
 2 5 6 1 4 8 
 3 10 10 4 4 18 
 4 7 6 4 2 18 
NSBC 1 4 3 1 1 6 
 2 4 4 2 2 8 
 3 5 6 1 2 8 
 4 4 4 2 1 8 
NSCM 1 9 8 5 3 26 
 2 15 12 13 6 68 
 3 22 16 18 6 72 
 4 14 12 10 6 58 
NBD 1 8 8 1 6 11 
 2 9 9 2 6 13 
 3 9 9 2 8 14 
 4 9 8 0 13  
NED 1 1 1 0 1 2 
 2 1 1 1 1 3 
 3 2 1 1 1 3 
 4 2 1 1 1 5 
NND 1 7 7 2 4 10 
 2 7 7 1 5 10 
 3 8 8 2 5 13 
 4 7 7 2 3 11 
NUBD 1 2 2 1 1 5 
 2 1 1 1 0 2 
 3 1 2 1 0 2 
 4 1 1 0 1 2 
NAO 1 1 1 1 1 3 
 2 1 1 0 1 2 
 3 1 1 1 0 2 
 4 1 1 1 1 4 
NTLS 1 24 25 6 15 36 
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 2 35 37 5 27 43 
 3 53 52 14 23 75 
 4 32 34 13 2 53 
NPUD 1 46 42 12 34 71 
 2 40 43 25 0 67 
 3 46 50 19 0 71 
 4 52 48 16 22 74 
NSOD 1 31 33 23 3 57 
 2 1 1 1 0 2 
 3 37 40 20 1 63 
 4 55 60 14 1 70 
NBOD 1 63 63 0 63 63 
 2 1 1 1 0 3 
 3 10 1 18 1 45 
 4 1 1 0 1 2 
 
 The determinants of board meeting 
frequency were explored using regression 
analysis.  The dependent variable is 
number of board meetings (NBM) 
(excluding telephonic meetings of the 
board).  The independent variables that 
capture (or are proxies) of the corporate 
governance mechanisms are: board size or 
number of members of the board (NBD); 
number of executives directors (NED), 
number of non executive directors (NND); 
number of standing board committees 
(NSBC); number of standing board 
committee meetings (NSCM); numbers of 
unaffiliated block holder directors 
(NUBD), Number of affiliated outsiders 
(NAO), number of percentage of shares 
held by largest shareholder (NTLS); 
number of percentage of total shares held 
by unaffiliated block holders (NPUB); 
number of percentage of shares held by 
officers and directors of the company 
(insider ownership) (NSOD), and number 
of other directorships held by outside 
directors (NBOD) 
 
 We use the Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficient to measure the 
degree of linear relationship between the 
board meeting frequency and selected 
corporate governance variables.  For a 
two-tailed test of the correlation, between 
the number of board meetings (NBM), and 
the various governance variables, the 
results are summarized in Table 4 below. 
The emerging expression is:  
NBM = ƒ (NBD 
+NED+NND+NSBC+NSCM+NUBD+N
AO+NTLS+NPUB+NSOD+ NBOD)  
 
The number of board meeting is 
significantly, in a statistically sense, 
related to the following variables:  NSBC 
(51.3 percent (%), NSCM (54.5 percent 
(%)), NBD (51.1 percent (%)), NND (52 
percent (%)), NUBD (14 percent (%)), 
NTLS (55 percent (%)), NPUB (32 percent 
(%)), NSOD (40 percent (%)), NBOD 
(negative 19.8 percent (%)). For the 
variables positively correlated with 
number of board meetings, the 
interpretation is that increases in such 
variables precede increases in the number 
of board meetings.  For example, as the 
number of standing board committees 
increase one would expect more board 
meetings to supervise, coordinate or ratify 
the recommendations made by various 
standing committees.  
 
It appears that the number of board 
meetings is negatively correlated with the 
number of other directorship (NBOD – 
19.8 percent (%)).  A possible explanation 
is that the directors will have to spread 
their time for board meetings across many 
companies and ultimately run out of time.  
At the same time, the number of directors 
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is a determinant of the number of standing 
committees i.e. as number of members of 
board increases, so is the capacity to create 
more standing and/or board committees. 
The committees would presumably handle 
most of the work that would have 
necessitated the attention of the full board.  
 
The correlation between number of board 
of directors (NBD) and number of non-
executive/independent directors (NND) is 
85.7percent.  it is possible that the 
inclusion of independent directors might 
not achieve its effect if non-independent 
directors outnumber them.  This happens 
when the existing directors respond to the 
statutory requirement that the board 
include non-executive directors by 
appointing non-executive directors who 
will not challenge the existing directors.  
This could have a far-reaching corporate 
governance implication because the board 
of directors would fail to effectively 
execute its oversight mandate over 
management. 
 
The number or percentage of shares held 
by officers and directors or insider 
ownership (NSOD) is positively correlated 
with the number of total shares held by 
affiliated owners. Furthermore, the number 
of other directorships held by outside 
directors (NBOD) is negatively correlated 
to number or percentage of shares held by 
officers and directors (Inside ownership) 
or NSOD. It is possible that the insiders 
could have formed companies that they 
use as an investment vehicle. It is equally 
possible that migration exists between 
outside directors and inside directors or 
that after some time, inside directors 
become outside directors. 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix of board meeting frequency and corporate governance variables. 
The table shows, in each cell, first the Pearson’s correlation coefficients, and below, the p-values, 
between corporate governance mechanisms and board activity. Corporate governance variables are 
defined and measured as follows: Number of board meetings (NBM), Number of board meetings (NBM), 
Number of board committees (NSBC), Number of committee meetings (NSCM), Number of board directors 
(NBD), Number of executive directors (NED), Number of non-executive directors (NND), Number of 
unaffiliated board directors (NUBD), Number of affiliated outside directors (NAO), Number proportion of 
shares held by largest shareholder (NTLS ), Number percentage of unaffiliated block holders (NPUB), Number 
percentage of shares held by insiders (NSOD), Number of other directorship held by outside directors (NBOD), 
Leadership Structure (BD), Director Incentive Plans (DIP ). 
 
 















        









       











      













     
     
NAO -.002 -0.096 -0.137 0.148 -.033 0.317 0.439 
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0.974 0.166 0.048 0.030 0.631 0.044 0.000 

















   


































































 Regression Results  
The objective at this stage was to explore the 
connection between board activity (NBM) and 
selected corporate governance variables. The 
regression equation explaining the number of 
board meeting (NBM) as a proxy for board 
activity is given in Table 5 and can be  is 
expressed as follows; 
NBM = -3.98-0.228 NSBC+0.0327 NSCM-
.688 NBD-3.23 NED+1.92 NND+1.20 NSOD 
+ UBD-1.56 NAO+0.124 NTLS +0.196 
NPUB- 0.107 NSOD + .222 NBOD .   
 
Table 5. Regression of board meeting frequency (independent variable) against corporate 
governance variables. 
Corporate governance variables are defined and measured as follows: Number of board meetings (NBM), 
Number of board meetings (NBM), Number of board committees (NSBC), Number of committee meetings 
(NSCM), Number of board directors (NBD), Number of executive directors (NED), Number of non-executive 
directors (NND), Number of unaffiliated board directors (NUBD), Number of affiliated outside directors 
(NAO), Number proportion of shares held by largest shareholder (NTLS ), Number percentage of unaffiliated 
block holders (NPUB),  and Number percentage of shares held by insiders (NSOD). 211.1=S ,
%78.922 =R  , 
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Table 5 shows the coefficients of the 
predictor variables in the regression of the 
variables against board meeting frequency. 
At 1% level of significance, the following 
variables have influence on the 
determination of board meeting frequency:  
number of executive directors (NED), 
number of non executive/independent 
directors (NND), number of total shares 
held by largest shareholder (NTLS), 
number/percentage of total shares held by 
unaffiliated block holders (NPUB) and  
number of other directorships held by 
outside directors (NBOD). Also having a 
significant influence on board activity is 
number of percentage of shares held by 
officers and directors (NSOD) at 5% level 
number of board directors (NBD) at 10%. 
We conclude that for these variables, over 
the period of study, variations in them 
were accompanied by variations in the 
number of board meetings. This implies 
we can use our knowledge of the variable 
whose value is different from zero to 
predict changes in board meetings and 
associated costs. These are confirmed by t-
values that are above the critical of 1.76 to 
show that the coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. 
 
The coefficient for number of board of 
directors (NBD) is negative meaning that 
the number of board meetings (NBM) 
decreases as the number of board directors 
(NBD) increases. Therefore the number of 
directors is useful in estimating average 
change in board activity (NBM). For 
example, for every one-unit change in the 
number of board of directors (board size), 
the board activity will on average decrease 
by 0.688. Again this is seen when NBD is 
considered along with other corporate 
governance variables. This finding concurs 
with Steiner (1972) assertion that process 
losses increase rapidly with group size. It 
is possible that a carefully selected 
membership of a large board is fully 
diversified and requires fewer board 
meetings (Changnati et al (1985) and 
Pearce and Zahra (1992)). This might be 
attributed to decentralization of decision 
making from the main board, to committee 
meetings.  
 
The increase in the number of executive 
directors (NED) is associated with the 
reduced board activity. The negative co-
efficient sign for number of executive 
directors (NED) of negative 3.2278 
confirms this. This is in line with the 
proposition that insiders tend to be more 
informed about the company’s affairs and 
hence require fewer board meetings. 
 
It appears that a large presence of non-
executive/independent directors (NND) is 
also accompanied by reduction of number 
of board meetings. This finding contradicts 
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the expectation that outside directors will 
need to be briefed more often, and that 
being independent they will monitor 
management more effectively through 
increased board meetings. Two reasons 
could be proffered. Either they are 
efficient thus managing a firm’s business 
in a few meetings or being busy with other 
engagements, they do not have time for a 
given firm’s board meetings.  
 
The number of total shares held by the 
largest shareholders (NTLS) and the 
number of percentage of total shares held 
by unaffiliated block holders are both 
positive and statistically significant. This 
is to be expected as the share ownership of 
companies quoted on the NSE is not 
widely dispersed (Jebet,2001) and hence 
they require more board meetings to stay 
well informed. 
 
As the number of shares held by insiders 
(NSOD) increases, the fewer the number 
of board meetings. This is consistent with 
the expectation that, in companies 
dominated by inside shareholders, a 
number of decisions are made at 
management level and later ratified by a 
board dominated or controlled by insiders. 
The earlier arrangements dilute the 
importance that is attached to regular 
board meetings. This confirms the 
hypothesis that monitoring role of external 
board members through board meetings is 
less critical for firms with higher 
proportions of inside ownership as high 
insider ownership helps align the interests 
between managers and shareholders. This 
finding concurs with Vafeas (1999) - that 
the percentage of inside ownership is 
inversely related to board activity. 
 
The number of other directorships held by 
outside directors (NBOD) emerge as 
influencing variable that impact positively 
on board meeting frequency. Successful 
directors are expected to hold similar 
positions in a number of companies. The 
greater the number of additional board 
seats held by a director the greater the 
reputation of that director, (Weir et al 
2002). The finding supports that of Vafeas 
(1999) but contradict Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) who suggested that the 
relationship is not linear as directors 
holding more than three directorships may 
be over extending themselves at the 
expense of their monitoring ability. 
 
In the regression equation above, the 
impact of the number of board committees 
(NSBC) of negative 0.2282 is 
insignificant. We therefore reject 
hypothesis that NSBC when considered 
along with other variables have impact on 
board activity (NBM). The same 
conclusion applies to number of standing 
board committee meetings (NSCM). One 
possible explanation is that the role of 
board committees in frequency of board 
meetings is ambivalent: some may argue 
committees create situations that require 
frequent full board ratification while others 
hold that committees substitute for the 
need of frequent meetings of the board. 
 
 Analysis of variances 
In addition we analysed the variances as 
reported in Table 6 to enable us assess the 
overall fit of the regression model. Using 
the F-test, we considered whether or not 
the ratio of the explained variance to 
unexplained variance is sufficiently high 
enough to reject the hypothesis that board 
meeting frequency is unrelated to 
corporate governance mechanisms. The 
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calculated F-test value  is 34.45 while the 
critical value at 5% is 2.12, leading us to 
conclude that knowledge of selected 
corporate governance variables is useful in 
predicting board activity (NBM). 
Furthermore, the R2  for the above 
regression is 92.7 percent. This measures 
the variation in board meeting frequency 
explained by the combined influence of all 
independent variables. We infer that 92.7 
percent of the observed changes in the 
dependent variable, NBM, have been 
explained or accounted for by combined 
changes in the predictor variables. 
 
Table 6. Analysis of Variance 
Source DF SS MS F-value P-value 
Regression 15 44.94 2.996 3.58 0.004 
Residual 
error 
20 16.73 0.837 
  
Total 35 61.67 
   
  
  
The Interactions between Board 
Meeting Frequency, Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms and the Firm 
Value 
 
From prior literature it is evident that the 
association between board meeting 
frequency and the value of the firm is not 
beyond question. The theoretical position 
is to expect benefits from board meetings 
to translate into profitability that ultimately 
translate into a higher firm value. 
 
We employed employ the price to book 
ratio1 as the measure of firm value. We 
also introduced control variables to 
neutralize differences in size (InMVF), 
return on total assets (ROTA), and return 
on equity (ROE). The emerging expression 
is: 
PBR = NBM + NSBC + NSCM + 
NED + NND + NUBD + NAO + 
NTLS + NPUB + NSOD + NBOD 
+ INMVF + RTA + ROE 
                                                 
1It is useful because it standardizes 
measures that capture increase in value 




PBR : Price to book ratio 
InMVF: Log of market value 
RTA : return on total assets 
ROE : return on equity 




The regression used the price book ratio as 
a proxy for firm value as a dependent 
variable and board meeting frequency and 
all corporate governance variables as 
independent variables. The results of the 
regression are as below:  
   
PBR (Firm value) = - 0.87 + 0.247 NBM – 
0.209 NSBC – 0.0011 NSCM – 0.085 
NBD + 0.37 NED-0.199 NND + 0.488 
NUBD + 0.87 NAO + 0.0148 NTLS – 
0.0760 NPUB+ 0.0523 NSOD + 0.689 
NBOD + 0.075 INMVF + 0.0439 RTA + 
0.0145 ROE. 
 These results are presented in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Regression of corporate governance variables on firm  value (PBR) 
Corporate governance variables are defined and measured as follows: Number of board meetings (NBM), 
Number of board meetings (NBM), Number of board committees (NSBC), Number of committee meetings 
(NSCM), Number of board directors (NBD), Number of executive directors (NED), Number of non-executive 
directors (NND), Number of unaffiliated board directors (NUBD), Number of affiliated outside directors 
(NAO), Number proportion of shares held by largest shareholder (NTLS ), Number percentage of unaffiliated 
block holders (NPUB),  Number percentage of shares held by insiders (NSOD). Price to book ratio (PBR), Log 
of market value (InMVF), return on total assets (RTA), and return on equity (ROE).  
9146.0=S      %9.722 =R        %5.52)(2 =adjustedR . 
Predictor  coefficient SE Coefficient T-stat p-value 
Constant -0.865  5.767 -0.15  0.882 
 
NBM  0.2468  0.1583  1.56  0.135 
 
NSBC  -0.2091 0.2792  -0.75 0.463 
 
NSCM  -0.00106 0.02014 -0.05  0.959 
 
NBD  -0.0847 0.3098 -0.27 0.787 
 
NED 0.366 1.107  0.33  0.745 
 
NND  -0.1989 0.4550  -0.44  0.667 
 
NUBD    0.4880 0.6944  0.70  0.490 
 




0.01482         0.05778 0.26  0.800 
 
NPUB -0.07603         0.06614  -1.15  0.264 
 
NSOD   0.05233        0.05235    1.00  0.329 
 
NBOD      0.6886 0.4792     1.44  0.166 
 
InMVF     0.0746 0.3668    0.20  0.841 
 
RTA 0.04393        0.06562 0.67  0.511 
 




One remarkable observation is that none of 
the coefficients are statistically 
significantly different from zero, even at 
10% level. However R2   at 72.9% is high. 
It was apparent that a regression using 
board meeting frequency and all corporate 
governance variables, as independent 
variables was not conveying enough 
information in terms of predicting firm 
value. 
 
Step wise regression 
To enhance the power of our tests, a 
stepwise regression was employed in 
selecting predictor variables. Stepwise 
regression removes and adds variables to a 
regression model for the purposes of 
identifying useful subset predictors. In step 
one of the stepwise regression, the variable 
return on equity (ROE) entered the model 
with significant coefficient; in step two the 
variable number of board meetings (NBM) 
entered the model, and so on. These 
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variables explain changes in market value 
of firms.  
 
The regression below better captures 
corporate governance variables that impact 
on the value of the firm. The variables that 
impact on the firm value (Price to Book 
Ratio) are NBM, NPUM, NSOD, NBOD 
(marginal) and ROE. The regression 
equation is: 
   PBR   =    - 0.83 + 0.153 NBM – 0.186 
NSBC – 0.323 NUBD – 0.727 NAO + 
0.0487 NPUB 
0.0399 NSOD + 0.688 NBOD + 0.0356 
RTA + 0.0290 ROE – 0.00208 RPS.
 
Table 8 Stepwise Regression of selected corporate governance variables on firm value. 
The regression equation is: PBR   =    - 0.83 + 0.153 NBM – 0.186 NSBC – 0.323 NUBD – 0.727 NAO + 
0.0487 NPUB -0.0399 NSOD + 0.688 NBOD + 0.0356 RTA + 0.0290 ROE – 0.00208 RPS. Corporate 
governance variables are defined and measured as follows: Price to Book Ratio (PBR),  Number of board 
meetings (NBM), Number of board meetings (NBM), Number of board committees (NSBC), Number of 
committee meetings (NSCM), Number of board directors (NBD), Number of executive directors (NED), 
Number of non-executive directors (NND), Number of unaffiliated board directors (NUBD), Number of 
affiliated outside directors (NAO), Number proportion of shares held by largest shareholder (NTLS ), Number 
percentage of unaffiliated block holders (NPUB),  Number percentage of shares held by insiders (NSOD). Price 
to book ratio (PBR), Log of market value (InMVF), return on total assets (RTA), and return on equity (ROE).  
8001.0=S      %2.712 =R        %0.61)(2 =adjustedR  . Level of  
significance are *** significance level 1%; ** significant level 5%; * significant level 10%. 
 
Predictor  Coefficient SE Coefficient T-stat p-value 
Constant -0.828   1.228  -0.67 0.506 
 
NBM            0.15287  0.07417 2.06**  0.049 
 




             0.3234              0.4887   0.66  0.513 
 
NAO               0.7265   0.9199 0.79  0.436 
 
NPUB -0.04871 0.01848 - 2.64*** 0.014 
NSOD  0.03990 0.01319   3.03*** 0.005 
 
NBOD    0.6878 0.3490  1.97*  0.059 
 
RTA 0.03562            0.03938 0.90  0.373 
 
ROE 0.02900            0.01159 2.50** 0.018 
 
RPS           0.002076         0.001289   1.61*             0.119 
Table 9. Analysis of Variance of the Stepwise Regression 
Source DF SS MS F-value P-value 
Regression 10 44.3689 4.4369 6.93 0.000 
Residual error 28 17.9228 0.6401 
  
Total 38 62.2912 
   
 
On examination of Table 8 and Table 9, 
the following interpretations can be 
supported. 
 
 Number of Board Meetings (NBM) and 
Firm Value 
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With a positive coefficient for NBM 
(+0.15237) the conclusion is that the value 
of a firm positively responds to changes in 
board meeting frequency. A potential 
inference is an active board can transform 
a loss making firm into a profitable one 
and that directors who meet more 
frequently are more likely to perform their 
duties than the ones that avoid meetings. 
Lorsch (1992) suggestion that directors 
who do not have enough time for board 
meeting are likely to be ineffective in 
monitoring management and creating 
value, is supported by these findings.  
Number of percentage of Shares Held 
by Unaffiliated Block Holders (NPUB) 
and Firm Value 
Total shares held by unaffiliated block 
holders are inversely related to firm value 
as indicated by the negative coefficient is 
(-0.04871).This is inconsistent with Vafeas 
(1999) assertion that unaffiliated owners of 
large equity of large equity blocks 
facilitate corporate governance since they 
have the power to discipline management. 
They can sack managers whose 
performance is below par Denis et al 
(1997).Good corporate governance 
mitigates agency problem thus enhancing 






Percentage of Shares Held By Officers 
and Directors of the Company or 
Insider Ownership (NSOD) and the 
Value of the Firm 
Our findings, a positive coefficient of 
0.03990 confirms the hypothesized 
relationship for companies listed at the 
NSE. This finding is in agreement with 
Jensen’s (1993) suggestion that inside 
ownership is an effecting corporate 
governance. Inside directors, because they 
have a stake in their firm takes keen 
interest in what is going on in the 
company, consequently mitigating agency 
problems. McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
consider insider ownership as an important 
control mechanism. 
 
 Number of Directorships Held by 
Outside Directors (NBOD) and the 
Value of the Firm 
In the regression above NBOD has a 
positive coefficient of 0.6878 that is 
statistically significant. This finding does 
not support Dowen (1995) who found that 
NBOD have no influence on firm 
performance; but is in line with Gilson 
(1990) and Kaplan and Reishus (1990) 
who present evidence that trace firm 
performance to director’s reputation. Weir 
et al (2002) argue that additional 
directorship is a proxy for director quality. 
Firms with directors of exceptional quality 
are expected to be more profitable than 
identical firms with low quality directors. 
This is because that class of directors will 
engender exceptional quality in superior 
decisions in order to preserve their 





We find that board activity as measured by 
the frequency of board meetings is related 
to a number of corporate governance 
variables such as the board size, the 
number of executive directors, number of 
total shares held by largest shareholder, the 
number of shares held by unaffiliated 
block holders; the number or percentage of 
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shares held by officers and directors 
(inside ownership) and the number of 
other directorship held by outside 
directors. Specifically we have evidence 
that the number of board meetings 
decrease with the board size, and that the 
number of board meetings decrease with 
the number/ percentage of shares held by 
officers and directors of the firm (inside 
ownership). Unlike Vafeas (1999) we find 
that the number of meetings increases with 
presence of unaffiliated owners of large 
equity blocks. The number of board 
meetings is also significantly related to the 
number of other directorships held by 
outside directors. Like the findings of 
Vafeas (1999) the use of board standing 
committees considered to provide directors 
effective contacts because they are small, 
have no impact on frequency of board 
meetings. Finally, the size of the firm as 
measured by the log of the market value 
has no discernible influence on the 
frequency of board meetings 
 
On the association between board meeting 
frequency and the value of the firm (price 
to book ratio) the results show that boards 
increase the frequency of their meetings 
following poor performance and as a 
consequence of such increase in firm value 
giving support to Jensen (1993) and 
Vafeas (1999) that the role of corporate 
boards becomes increasingly more 
important during crises, when 
shareholders’ interests are in visible 
danger. The results further show that the 
relationship between governance 
mechanisms and performance is a complex 
one. They raise questions about the 
efficacy of a policy that imposes 
prescribed internal governance structures 
on firms because such approach creates 
difficulties when trying to assess the 
effectiveness of those mechanisms given 
the differences among firms. (In this study 
we were unable to assess the effectiveness 
of leadership structure as all public listed 
companies have a separate leadership 
structure as required by CMA). 
 
 Implication on Policy And Practice 
Given the differences among firms, there 
is need for regulators to constantly review 
the efficacy of corporate governance 
guidelines and regulations and allow for 
more flexibility in the governance system 
as opposed to the “one size fits all” 
approach presently adopted which makes it 
difficult to assess and improve the 
effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms. Shareholders and investors 
should insist on more detailed information 
on the frequency of board and standing 
committee and how much time is spent at 
such meetings so as to be better informed 
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